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In September 2002, an article in the Johannesburg Sunday Times declared a “torrent 
of praise for water man” Neil Macleod—the executive director of eThekwini Water 
Services (eTWS).1 The paper went on to extol his tremendous efforts and ingenuity 
“in turning around Durban’s water woes” (Horner 2002). eThekwini Municipality’s 
own publication, METRObeat, “saluted” Macleod and his department for having 
transformed the city’s crumbling water network and having ensured that “Durban 
leads the way in providing one of the most basic necessities of life: water” 
(METRObeat, October 2002). Both articles were media responses to an award 
presented to Macleod by the US National Geographic magazine, along with the 
enormous praise he had received from both the South African government and other 
international agencies from around the world. Studies by the Water, Engineering and 
Development Centre (WEDC) at Loughborough University (PDG 2000), Palmer 
Development Group (DWAF 2001) and the World Bank (2001) have also marvelled 
at the municipal utility.  
 
Praise is normally directed at the utility’s vision and dynamism in responding to the 
needs of the urban poor whilst simultaneously being able to recover costs (Durban is 
said to be 93% effective at full cost recovery (DWAF 2001)) and reduce overall 
                                                          
1
 eThekwini Municipality came into being following the amalgamation of former tribal land into the 
Durban Metropolitan Area on December 5, 2000. This is the functional name given to the entity many 
people still refer to as Durban. Durban Metro Water Services has thus become eThekwini Water 
Services. 
 2 
demand for water. To some extent there has become something of a cult of the 
Durban example and the individual at its helm. Both are seen to be offering hope to 
other public sector providers around the world. To many, they seem to provide 
evidence that the state is not the unresponsive dinosaur talked of by neoliberal 
analysts. Instead, it can innovate, modernise and respond to consumer concerns whilst 
simultaneously being efficient, cost-conscious and fiscally austere. To some, it has 
become the ideal commercialised public utility. 
 
Whilst accepting many of the positive gains that have taken place in Durban, this 
chapter goes beneath the sheen to reveal the troubled waters below. I argue, in 
particular, that the introduction of the free basic water policy within the city has 
paradoxically been a mixed blessing. While guaranteeing a minimum amount of water 
per month to all households, the free water policy has also resulted in a rise in the 
surveillance of supplies and the imposition of severe restrictions to the amount a 
family is able to consume. This situation has been greatly exacerbated by the 
structural constraints in which the municipality finds itself. On the one hand the 
commercialisation of the city’s bulk supplier (Durban buys all its supplies of water 
from Umgeni Water—a former water board—which subsequently has an enormous 
influence over the final costs of water in the city) and on the other the haunting 
spectre of privatisation have had a profound influence on the shape and direction of 
eThekwini Water Service’s policies. Thus, twin logics—one paternalistic, the other 
commercial—run through all new developments within Durban’s water services. As 
these logics intertwine and diverge they threaten to tear apart what seems on the 
surface to be a step towards greater equity in the shape of a free basic water policy. 
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The research is based on in-depth case studies in three contrasting but neighbouring 
areas of the city—KwaMashu, Mzinyathi and Inanda. KwaMashu is a large township 
constructed from the early 1960s after the eviction of families from Cato Manor. Its 
formal layout has been serviced with water from the time of construction. Inanda is a 
large informal settlement, comprising 33 distinct communities. It brims with political 
history and had a strong and autonomous anti-apartheid youth movement in the late 
1980s which was targeted by both the Inkatha Freedom Party and the apartheid 
authorities (see Hemson 1996). Here, water services are being introduced at differing 
levels of service, from standpipes to household connections. Mzinyathi lies on the 
banks of the Inanda dam and consists of dispersed round mud huts. Individual ground 
tanks (one of the municipality’s supposed innovations, discussed later) have been 
introduced since 2001. All three areas have extremely high levels of unemployment 
and poverty. 
 
In KwaMashu, three community workshops were held over water issues in Section C 
of the township. These were structured as focus group interviews with participants 
discussing their ability to access water, how this has changed historically and how 
they felt it could be transformed in the future. Space was opened up for as much 
participation as possible and the meetings ended up driven by the issues highlighted 
by participants. All responses were summarised at the end of the workshops and they 
were followed up with in-depth household interviews. In Inanda, community 
workshops were held in Amaoti, Bhambayi and Amatikwe. Again these were 
followed up with in-depth household interviews. In Mzinyathi, households were 
randomly sampled in an area recently targeted with a large water project and in-depth 
interviews conducted with members of the households living there. The number of 
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participants in the community workshops ranged from fifty in KwaMashu to ten in 
Bhambayi. In all five areas (including the three in Inanda), at least twenty follow up 
household interviews were conducted. I also interviewed the councillors of all these 
areas and when possible met with the ward committees and civic organisations or 
development forums currently operating in the area. I also integrated some random 
individual sampling in each area, conducting interviews at standpipes and interviews 
with next-door neighbours of those who had been at the community workshops rather 
than the actual participants in some cases. Supplementary interviews were conducted 
with senior managers at eThekwini Water Services and within the municipal 
bureaucracy.  
 
This range of techniques gives a particularly detailed picture of what residents feel 
about their water services. This is in marked contrast to much of the media spin which 
relied on interviews with a few senior managers at eTWS.  I begin, however, with the 
media’s spin on Durban’s successes to provide an outline of what are, undeniably, 
some of the important service delivery gains that have been made in the city.  
 
Durban’s “Spin” 
Durban Metro Water Services is widely understood to have been one of the pioneers, 
if not the pioneer of the free basic water policy in South Africa. In a press statement 
issued on October 13, 2000, soon after President Mbeki’s announcement of the 
government’s intention of providing free water to all households, the Minister for 
Water Affairs, Ronnie Kasrils, highlighted Durban as one of the best case examples, 
offering hope to other municipalities throughout South Africa. Kasrils stated that 
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Durban proved the feasibility of Free Basic Water whilst simultaneously showing that 
such a radical policy could make sound financial sense (Kasrils 2000a).  
The development of this policy in Durban now seems to have become a part of 
international water folklore,2 having been recounted in several research reports 
(Macleod 1997, PDG 2000, DWAF 2001, World Bank 2001) and having been told so 
many times to budding researchers by the main protagonists it is difficult to detach 
real fact from embellished fact. In retrospect, as Macleod and others are keen to 
stress, one of the key moments in the beginning of Durban’s journey to a free water 
policy was the development of a ground tank system in informal areas. This allowed a 
fixed amount of water (200 litres per household per day) to be delivered at a relatively 
low cost to shack areas in the municipality. Initially, residents were charged for the 
service but the municipality soon realised that the cost of charging individual 
households outweighed the revenue generated. It was therefore cheaper to provide the 
service for free.  
 
Looking at the rest of the municipality and the costs involved in disconnecting 
households, it was judged on both the grounds of economic efficiency and universal 
fairness that the service should be extended to all consumers within the municipality 
(interview, Reg Bailey, September 5, 2002; interview, Dom Magubane September 9, 
2002). Thus, six kilolitres per household per month (200 litres per day), fixed by the 
size of the ground tank (and based on an early estimate of the amount of water used 
by the average household in an informal settlement) became the fixed free water 
figure in Durban.3  
                                                          
2
 At various water seminars in Oxford, I have found this to be one of the first points around which 
others will engage, several already having carried out research on the free water story. 
3
 It soon became the target for municipalities throughout South Africa. It is worth commenting at this 
stage on the level of the free basic water allowance. Whereas it has some bearing on an early 
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Durban has been keen to innovate medium- and low-tech options for the provision of 
water to poorer areas of the city. It has experimented with water kiosks, water bailiffs, 
ground tanks, semi-pressure systems, flow limiting devices, flow restricting devices 
and free water standpipes. Not all of these are “home-grown” Durban developments; 
however, the large number of technological experiments attest to the dynamism of 
individuals within the company (many cite Macleod’s vision, although Macleod 
himself is keen to point to the “inventiveness” of former Director, Roy Pinkerton). 
They are also, perhaps, a sign of the austere environment in which the utility is forced 
to operate. I will discuss the constraints imposed by the bulk supplier, Umgeni Water, 
later in this paper but it is worth noting here that the pressure to reduce costs, recover 
costs, lower demand and extend the network to outlying areas has forced eTWS to 
innovate. 
 
Another “technical” solution to water provision has been the introduction of a more 
progressive block tariff on water prices.  The current tariff structure (calculated over a 
30 day period) is outlined in Table 1. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
calculation of the needs of residents in an informal settlement, it should in no way be assumed that the 
needs of all residents in formal township are the same. As Arrighi (1970, 211) writes, “the terms 
‘necessities’ or ‘subsistence’ are not to be understood in an exclusively physiological sense: people get 
used to what they consume and ‘discretionary’ consumption items can, with the mere passage of time, 
become necessities whose consumption is indispensable.”  Whether six kilolitres (Kl) per month 
provides sufficient water for the “physiological” needs of many residents is itself debatable, but it 
certainly does not fulfil the socially defined needs of the majority of those interviewed. 
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Partly through such a tariff mechanism, the city has been able to reduce and stabilise 
demand for water at 1995 levels. It has also been able to extend the network to 
100,000 new households through both the ground tank and semi-pressure tank system 
(Horner 2002, METRObeat 2003, interview, Neil Macleod: March 26, 2003). eTWS 
also replaced much of the decaying network in the city’s townships, thereby 
dramatically reducing unaccounted for water. In one section of KwaMashu, daily 
consumption was reduced from 25,000 kilolitres to 17,000 kilolitres per day because 
of the improvements to infrastructure and the targeting of illegal connections 
(METRObeat).  
 
Macleod has likened the process to a “military operation” (Horner 2002), a metaphor 
that seems particularly apt when one considers some of the measures the municipality 
has gone to in ensuring that all those who benefit from the improved service abide by 
its payment plans. The municipality’s METRObeat publication referred to the 
operation as “plugging the flow”—another pertinent observation for those who have 
had their supplies “plugged” to a volume far lower than they were once receiving. 
 
Table 1: Charges in Rand/kl of water consumed as of July 2003 
Monthly 
Consumption 
 
Ground tank. 
Low 
pressure. 
Roof tank. 
Semi-pressure 
system. 
Domestic. 
Full 
pressure. 
Industrial, 
commercial. 
and other users 
0kl to 6kl nil nil nil 5.72 
from 6kl to 30kl n/a 3.81 5.72 5.72 
more than 30kl n/a 11.45 11.45 5.72 
fixed charge nil nil 0-44.71 39.22-4,471.08 
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Interestingly, eTWS’ innovative approach has also received the attention of private 
sector providers. From 1998, French multinational water provider Vivendi has been 
engaged in two phases of a trisector partnership with eTWS, originally under the 
Business Partners for Development KwaZulu Natal pilot project (see Lumsden and 
Loftus 2003). Although Vivendi’s initial hope of gaining a contract out of their 
dealings with the municipality was clearly one of the main motivations for the 
partnership, the knowledge it is gaining from working with eTWS in informal areas is 
also now seen as a major commercial asset in bidding for contracts in other cities in 
the South. There is also clearly more than a smattering of good public relations to be 
gained from such a “benevolent” venture. 
 
Beneath the Spin—From Disconnections to Restrictions 
Having outlined some of the progressive steps Durban has been able to make in 
improving water access for the urban poor, I turn now to some of the serious problems 
being experienced by households in the case-study areas. The central theme running 
through this discussion is the pressure being placed on households to restrict their 
water supply. In spite of the free water policy, many households have amassed large 
water payment arrears and continue to receive large bills from the municipality. The 
harsh response from the municipality towards those who have consumed more than 
they can afford is then couched in terms of “helping” families to regulate their own 
household supplies by reducing their bills. Because poor families tend to be those who 
have problems paying their water bills, these restrictive measures have, almost 
without exception, been targeted at the poor. 
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As with most other municipalities across South Africa, water disconnections have 
provoked some of the greatest post-apartheid resentment in the country (McDonald 
and Pape 2002). In Durban, the problem of disconnections came to light dramatically 
in a court case between the Durban Transitional Metropolitan Council and Christina 
Manquele. With assistance from the newly-formed Concerned Citizens Forum, 
Manquele, a 35-year-old mother of seven from Chatsworth argued that the Council’s 
disconnection of her water supply was a breach of her right to water as enshrined in 
the 1997 Water Services Act. The case went to court in 2001 and at first, with the 
municipality being ordered to reinstate Manquele’s water supply, it looked like she 
would win her case. However, in its final judgement, the court argued that because 
she had “chosen” not to limit herself to the Council’s free water allowance and, 
moreover, had tried to reconnect illegally, Manquele had forgone any right to water.4 
Immediately after the case, the municipality stated that even though it had won and 
thereby ensured its right to be able to disconnect, it would not disconnect supplies any 
more but would merely restrict individual households to the free basic allowance 
through the installation of flow restrictors or “tricklers”.  
 
The situation is now somewhat blurred. Several households visited during the course 
of this research (and a Primary School in Inanda) were physically disconnected from 
the water supply for non-payment at the time of the research (January to May 2003). 
Repeatedly, however, when I followed these cases up with either the management at 
eThekwini Water Services or with the internal department responsible for “account 
management”, they argued this was impossible—the bailiffs had been instructed to 
                                                          
4
 The case is well documented in Ashwin Desai’s We Are the Poors (2002). See also 
http://www.communitylawcentre.org.za/localgov/bulletin2001/2001_1_manquele.php 
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insert restrictors and not disconnect.5 To avoid undue criticism, however, I will 
assume these disconnections are anomalies. This will also allow me to enter into a 
more in depth discussion of the effects of the “fairer” policy of restricting supplies.  
 
Since the development of a free water policy, eTWS has channelled much of its 
efforts into ensuring poor households limit their consumption to this free water 
allowance (and sometimes a level somewhere below this because of the unreliable 
methods of measurement used) or to a level that households might regard as 
affordable. In effect, the  provision of this lifeline supply of free water has provided  
something of a moral justification for disconnections and restrictions and helped to 
fend off criticisms and reduce the likelihood of community mobilisations. It was this 
moral position that allowed the municipality to declare a victory in the Manquele case 
and deflect criticisms that it was acting in an unduly harsh manner.  
 
Flow restrictors, or “tricklers”, are the most common way of restricting water use. 
They consist of a simple disc with a narrow hole in the middle, which dramatically 
reduces the diameter of pipes at the meter, thus restricting the flow to a daily level 
that approximates the free water allowance. Such a method is notoriously unreliable, 
however, being determined to a large extent by the ambient water pressure (which is 
often quite low in township areas). A prime example of this (and representative of 
many other cases) is shown by a household in KwaMashu C. Here, the household 
head had entered into an agreement with eTWS to have her water supply restricted 
(after having received several threatening letters from the municipality about her 
payment arrears).   She is now receiving less than two kilolitres per month, despite the 
                                                          
5
 It should be noted that senior managers still consistently referred to “disconnections”. This could 
either be a sign of the relatively recent shift in policy or a recognition that the outcome is qualitatively 
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fact that her tap is left open for the vast majority of the day in order to collect water. 
She describes the situation: 
 
It takes about one hour to fill 10-15 litres. In some houses it’s a little better 
but in others it’s just as bad. I just put a big bucket under the tap and hold 
water in this. I flush the toilet with water from my washing. I did go to the 
Metro about this but they took no notice. I applied for it [the restrictor] myself 
but didn’t know it would be like this. Other people just open it in their own 
way [through acts of vandalism] but I’m scared to do this myself. 
 
Such situations emphasise the contradictions of eThekwini Water Services’ current 
policy, whereby residents are forced to restrict their water supplies to a level that is 
threatening to their own personal health. Community workshops reported many 
similar situations. Some residents noted how they would leave the house for an hour 
and return to find the bucket they had left under the tap still not full. Others discussed 
the difficulties of dividing such a small amount of water between all household tasks. 
Others noted the disparities between the levels the trickler was meant to provide and 
the actual amount received.  
 
In an interview with Macleod in early 2003, he confirmed that 800 to 1000 
“disconnections”6 were taking place across the municipality daily, amounting to 
roughly 4-5,000 per week, affecting as many as 25,000 people. Some of these 
households have their flow restored, but the problem of under-consumption of water 
due to water restrictors is clearly widespread in Durban. 
 
“Flow limiters” offer a more advanced (but often even less reliable) alternative. These 
operate electronically and shut the flow off to an individual household after a certain 
volume has been delivered. Several of the households interviewed understood this 
                                                                                                                                                                      
similar 
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device to be working on a timer, shutting off the supply at 9:00 in the morning for 
example (interviews, KwaMashu C). In fact, the limiter was restricting supplies to 
200 litres per day and shutting water flow off after this has been consumed. The 
breakdown in communication as to how the system was operating was creating its 
own set of problems for residents as they rushed to consume what was actually a 
volumetric measurement, creating any early cut-off time. 
 
Both the flow limiters and flow restrictors are far more prevalent in formal township 
areas than in the informal areas or new subsidised housing developments in the city. 
But households in formal townships have received a piped supply of water for far 
longer than most others, so the anger and resentment is often more forthright. 
Community meetings were frequently more explosive with households in these areas, 
demanding answers to their questions over bills, restrictions and disconnections.  The 
following quotes capture some of this anger and anguish: 
 
They can’t put me in jail…can’t put me in jail. They told me to pay 70 
something. They will think we’ve been playing with the water. My pension is 
R600 and the bill is R400. How can I pay this? 
 
I’m the only person who deals with it and I’m a pensioner. Yes, we were 
disconnected once for a long time and borrowed water from neighbours. I 
have been to the Metro in KwaMashu to discuss bills. We’re just washing 
ourselves and flushing the toilet. Before it wasn’t really an issue how much 
you used. Now I’m trying to think of the 1,000s. I don’t know what I’ll do 
about the high bills. 
 
Payment problems were some of the most common at meetings. Again, this is the 
reason generally cited by the municipality for having to restrict supplies. It is true, 
from billing records, that some in KwaMashu C are consuming much more than the 
average throughout Durban (and as a result much more than they can afford). This is 
                                                                                                                                                                      
6
 Presumably, he meant by this that tricklers are being put in place. 
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somewhat curious though, given the lack of gardens, swimming pools or cars. Much 
of the higher consumption can be attributed to larger household sizes. It should also 
be noted that census data often fails to reflect true household size because of the 
highly mobile populations. Thus, some families are falling into the 12-30Kl/month 
tariff block and others are even falling into the 30Kl + block. As a result, they find 
that their bills get rapidly out of hand. One township family had amassed arrears of 
R30,000 and many examples of arrears of over R10,000 were encountered. The large 
increases in rates above 30Kl hit these residents incredibly hard, and with many 
lacking any income or relying on a meagre pension, the situation becomes impossible. 
To put this in context, 54% of households in KwaMashu C have an income of less 
than R18,000 per year, 12% lack any income (Urban Strategy 2001). Problems are 
compounded by the leaky plumbing many have within their properties. Although the 
municipality offers the service of a plumber to inspect for leaks for R200, this is well 
beyond the means of many households. The newly imposed restrictions are also 
creating a strange catalytic effect on the bills of others. Rather than simply creating an 
atomised problem for individual households to have to deal with, households have to 
beg, borrow or steal water from others in order to have any access. This pushes the 
bills of other residents up and creates a spiral of arrears in which more and more find 
themselves having to manage an escalating household debt. 
 
In an interview, Macleod argued that these problems remained ones of “a culture of 
entitlement in which people don’t respect the economic value of water” (interview, 
March 26, 2003). There is little evidence to support such claims and it is interesting to 
note that Macleod bases many of his views on anecdotal evidence such as the 
prevalence of mobile phones in townships, suggesting to him that residents can afford 
 14
to pay for water but refuse to do so. More detailed, participatory-type research of the 
sort carried out for this project reveals a different picture—one in which poorer 
residents are painfully aware of the economic value of water but unable to cope with 
the rising arrears they have amassed. 
 
For the moment, the greatest of these problems are felt by residents of formal 
townships. The difference in most informal areas and new, subsidised housing 
projects is that supplies are automatically “regulated” because of the mode of delivery 
being installed. Almost without exception, residents in these areas will get their water 
from a free water standpipe, a groundtank or a semi-pressure tank. Although not 
explicitly developed to provide a more limited quantity of water to poorer households, 
the semi-pressure tank has this effect by reducing the pressure of the water to 
households and restricting the volume that can be obtained over a certain period. The 
ground tank (when operating as intended) limits household consumption to a fixed 
200 litre per day allowance. Free water standpipes limit consumption because of the 
limited capacity of the human body to carry loads of water.  
 
Relationships between eTWS and its Bulk Water Provider 
 
People, Planet, Profit. Umgeni Water’s “Triple bottom line” ( Umgeni Water 
2002, 1) 
 
We turn now to look at the broader context within with eTWS operates; specifically 
its relationship with its bulk water supplier, Umgeni Water.  Here, I argue that the 
structural constraints imposed by Umgeni ensure that progressive developments for 
poorer residents will fail.  
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Since 1983, Durban has been required to buy its water supplies from the Umgeni 
Water Board. Ostensibly created to mediate between different users of the Umgeni 
River basin, this water board has acquired substantial powers in determining the tariff 
Durban will be required to set for end users. Much of the bulk water infrastructure 
managed by Umgeni Water is actually owned by the national government which also 
plays an important role in selecting the members of the board. A complicated 
relationship has thus developed between the national and local governments with the 
third party mediator causing many of these problems. Most recently, Umgeni Water 
has appeared in the national papers owing to a series of corporate scandals and 
financial mismanagements and its relationship with the two large municipalities it 
serves (Durban and Pietermaritzburg) has almost reached breaking-point. Tariff 
increases passed on to the municipalities are largely seen as unjustifiable and more a 
result of Umgeni’s attempts to commercialise than any real increases in the 
production costs of water. 
 
Throughout much of the last century, the municipality, advised by its City Engineer’s 
Department, fought the creation of a water board to supply its bulk water (see, for 
example, Kinmont (1959)). When the Umgeni Water Board was finally created in the 
1970s (with Macleod’s father the head of Durban’s water services at the time), the 
entity seemed to have much more to do with the apartheid state’s need to justify its 
Bantustan creations than it did with sound water management. As Macleod is still 
keen to stress, the decision was clearly political. A third party was needed to intervene 
in the sale of water to KwaZulu if the future state’s “independence” was not to be 
revealed as a hollow sham—a state, after all, could not be seen to be buying water 
from a city. The Umgeni Water Board would fulfil this third party function, in spite of 
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the fact that Durban had built up its own bulk water works over the previous 
century—its water engineers being elevated to something of local hero status (an 
excellent example of this is in the City Engineer’s Department centennial publication, 
gloriously titled They Built a City (Lynski 1982)). 
 
After long, drawn-out negotiations, the water board finally acquired all of Durban’s 
bulk water infrastructure in 1983. The amount paid for the works was high and 
reflected not only the value Durban placed on its bulk water infrastructure but also the 
bitterness and sense of victimisation it felt at the hands of a National Party 
government it claimed to reject. Initial government investments of the value of 
Durban’s infrastructure put the figure at R13 million but the water board was to pay 
R274 million (interview, Neil Macleod, March 26, 2003). Not surprisingly, Umgeni 
was soon in serious debt.  
 
As Durban’s townships were then “handed over” to the KwaZulu administration in 
1986, a bizarre system developed. The Umgeni Water Board would sell bulk water 
supplies to Durban, this would be reticulated through the municipality’s network and 
then, at the newly defined border, water would be sold back to the board so that it 
could be sold on to the KwaZulu administration. In KwaZulu reticulation would take 
place through a network that, only a few years previously, had been built and operated 
by the local municipality. 
 
The anomalous nature of Umgeni acquired even greater meaning as its accounting 
procedures and investment practices switched from being major revenue earners to 
huge loss generators. Essentially, the managers proved themselves to be skilled at 
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raising finance but not so skilled at finding productive outlets for investments from 
the capital they had raised. Periodic crises emerged as it seemed that Umgeni might 
not be able to keep up its long-term debt repayments. The easiest way out of the 
periodic slumps they found themselves in was to increase bulk water tariffs. The cost 
of bulk water to Durban began to soar as a result.  
 
Post apartheid, the 1998 Water Act has allowed water boards to set up commercial 
subsidiaries. Although these are required to be “ringfenced”, so that risk is not passed 
on to the parastatal, often the links are far more blurred. The losses incurred by either 
the public or the private part can therefore have serious effects on the partner 
organisation. It is largely with this in mind that I refer to the commercialisation of 
Umgeni Water, although its continued ability to access cheap finance on the private 
markets and its need to service debt repayments on these should be seen as a closely-
related problem. Thus, still searching for good areas for investment in order to keep 
up repayments on its long term debt, Umgeni Water was quick to set up a commercial 
subsidiary, which—following Mbeki’s “African Renaissance” vision—set about 
expanding operations into Nigeria. Umgeni Water’s stated (and rather over ambitious 
to say the least) aim is to become the “leading water services provider in the South” 
(Umgeni Water 2002, 4). By 2002, it had operations planned or functioning in 
Algeria, Botswana, Ethiopia, Ghana, Lesotho, Malawi and Rwanda (although the vast 
majority of these were subsequently cancelled at a major loss to Umgeni (Umgeni 
Water 2003)). Water Minister Ronnie Kasrils praised Umgeni for according so closely 
with what he understands to be the African Renaissance (Kasrils 2000b) and Umgeni 
frequently cited the opportunities opened up by the New Partnership for African 
Development as a major driving force for their imperial ambitions (Umgeni Water 
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2002, 4). Under radically different national governments, Umgeni Water has thus 
come to be used as a tool for pursuing quite distinctive political agendas. On top of 
the international ventures, Umgeni Water has been a major player in the market for 
rural water contracts in KwaZulu Natal. These have exacerbated its financial woes 
still further and provided an additional source of tensions with the municipalities who 
are now responsible for taking over the losses incurred on Umgeni’s highly inefficient 
projects.  
 
With a potentially loss-making commercial venture on top of the anomalous water 
board, tensions with the municipality increased once again. It began to look like high 
tariffs at home would be financing the risky commercial ventures abroad. The Durban 
consumer, some argued, would be held responsible for this risk. When, in 2001, 
Umgeni Water tried to impose a 22% price increase on bulk water supplies, Durban 
and Pietermaritzburg rebelled. This, they argued would lead to a 28% increase to 
households within their constituencies (Mhlanga 2001), something which neither 
municipality was able or prepared to bear. The link between Umgeni’s faltering 
investments outside of bulk supply and the increases passed on to Durban is made 
explicit in the 2001/2 Annual Report for Umgeni, which stated that “It is the costs 
relating to these rural schemes that have resulted in the 19.5% tariff increase (reduced 
from the initial 22.3% due to Umgeni Water cost-cutting and efficiency 
achievements) for the 2001/2002 year. Without the cost burden of these schemes, 
Umgeni Water would have been able to pass on an increase of 8%” (Umgeni Water 
2002, 29).  
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Part of the subsequent pressure on the municipality to resist these increases came 
from the threat (whether real or not) that a large number of Durban’s textile 
manufacturers would almost instantly relocate if the tariff increase was imposed 
(interview, Colin Butler April 17, 2003). Links between eTWS and the Chamber of 
Commerce had traditionally not been confrontational and in this instance they seemed 
able to form an alliance against Umgeni (an alliance which appeared not for the direct 
benefit of the poorest of the city, it should be noted). Their position was supported  by 
a Halcrow report prepared for eTWS, and mentioned frequently in interviews, which 
is said to have claimed that a 30% reduction in costs could be passed onto the Durban 
public if the system was rationalised into a single tier (interview, Neil Macleod March 
26, 2003). The pressure worked and Umgeni was forced into a retreat, lowering the 
increase to 19.5% and then keeping it fixed to the rate of inflation from then on. On 
top of this, various threats seem to suggest that its days as a separate utility could be 
numbered if such financial mismanagement continues. Whispers of a potential 
rationalisation of Durban’s bulk water supply into a single tier system began to 
spread. The ears of Vivendi pricked up once again, as it seemed that a single entity 
could offer a much more lucrative contract (interview, Eric Tranchent, November 5, 
2002). 
 
Nevertheless, eThekwini Water Services cannot lay all of the blame for unaffordable 
bills in townships on its bulk water provider. Whereas average bills are undoubtedly 
higher because of the presence of this semi-commercial bulk water provider (and 
restrictions therefore more prevalent), there is still greater scope for redistributing the 
burden of these increases away from the least vulnerable within the municipality 
through cross subsidisation. The presence of Umgeni has limited the options available 
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to the municipality, but given the acquiescence of eTWS to the demands of industry, 
as opposed to the needs of poorer residents, Umgeni’s dissolution would unlikely 
resolve the affordability crisis of low-income households in Durban.  
 
Even though both eThekwini Municipality’s city manager and Neil Macleod stated in 
interviews that they would be in favour of a single entity providing both bulk water 
and reticulation in the municipality, the fate of Umgeni Water is far from sealed.  The 
arrival of a more conciliatory head at Umgeni—Gugu Moloi—may also mean a more 
collaborative approach to operations. 
 
The Spectre of Privatisation? 
Within South Africa’s current neoliberal climate both Umgeni Water and eThekwini 
Water Services are forced to be increasingly competitive. Whereas one strategy 
available to Umgeni was to attempt to transform itself into a sub-imperial water 
multinational, Durban has found itself competing with separate municipalities for the 
location of textile production and other water intensive industries (Durban also has a 
large paper mill). eTWS also needs to prove itself against both Umgeni Water and 
other multinational water providers who are themselves keen to stress that they could 
do the job of providing water for cheaper. Privatisation is clearly a spectre that haunts. 
But how real is the threat? 
 
Certainly, in the late 1990s it looked like a major concession contract with a large 
multinational was a real possibility in the city. The Business Partners for 
Development pilot project in Inanda and Ntuzuma, begun in 1998, looked like a clear 
testing of the waters in Durban by Vivendi. A wastewater recycling plant was also 
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constructed by a Vivendi subsidiary as part of a Build Operate Own and Transfer 
contract signed in 1998. As late as 2002, representatives from Vivendi were still 
talking of the possibility of a major concession contract in Durban (interview, Eric 
Tranchent, November 5, 2002).  
 
However, much of this threat now seems to have receded, both because of the 
insecure environment in which many large water multinationals realise they are now 
operating in countries in the south,  and in view of the real possibility that major 
contracts might collapse in Buenos Aires, Jakarta and other major Third World cities. 
Potential profits now seem far less secure. In addition to this, senior officials in the 
private sector are quoted as citing apparent labour militancy in South Africa as a 
reason for not wishing to enter into further major concession contracts (World Bank 
2001). A final, more subtle, factor is associated with the fact that many public service 
providers have already learnt to act like private sector providers. As a result, for some 
local councillors, the attraction of a multinational coming to run the water services of 
Durban has lost much of its shine over the last few years. Both the current city 
manager and representatives from the water company stated that they could see little 
or no reason for a major concession contract when they felt that the city’s engineers 
could run the service better on their own (interviews, Reg Bailey, September 5, 2002, 
February 14, 2003; interview, Mike Sutcliffe, September 19, 2002). The stringent 
cost-recovery measures implemented by eTWS provide ample testimony to this. 
Instead, corporatisation seems to have become something of a sought after Third Way 
for the bureaucrats at eThekwini Water Services and city council. Thus, 
multinationals still act as something against which eTWS appears benchmarked, but 
the reality of a large privatisation contract with such a multinational is distant 
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CONCLUSION 
 
I pondered all these things, and how men fight and lose the battle, and the thing 
that they fought for comes about in spite of their defeat, and when it comes turns 
out not to be what they meant, and other men have to fight for what they meant 
under another name. William Morris. 
 
Durban led the way in South Africa in developing a free basic water policy. The 
manner in which this has been introduced and the external pressures exerted on the 
municipality have produced paradoxical results. For some, it has meant the ability to 
access a free supply of clean water for the first time in their lives. For others, it has 
meant the escalation of bills, a closer surveillance of the amount consumed and the 
restriction of supplies to a level barely enough to survive on.  
 
Commercialisation has been taking place most overtly in the city’s bulk water 
provision. Here, Umgeni Water has entered into several risky commercial ventures 
and has fallen back on its bulk water sales to make up any short-term losses. The 
spectre of privatisation and the competitive environment in which both Umgeni Water 
and eTWS are now having to operate has fostered a business-minded logic that 
provides little space for the isolated and poor household unable to pay its bill. Within 
the local state, the need to be both developmental and cheap—whilst at the same time 
fostering an environment conducive to industrial investment—has produced its own 
set of contradictions. The paradoxical effects of the free water policy can thus be seen 
as an outcome of this particular choreography of power relations. A right to water is 
thus accompanied with a clampdown on many households’ access to water. To some 
extent, the recognition of this has helped to reconfigure the direction in which some 
are taking a struggle to ensure their access to water is guaranteed. This implies a shift 
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away from a struggle that fetishises water yet further and urges a transformation of the 
social relations that daily reproduce inequality in Durban. 
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